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How Do We Continue to Learn Throughout Life? 
We experience the world as a whole. Although myriad signals relentlessly bombard 
our senses, we somehow integrate them into unified moments of conscious experience that 
cohere together despite their diversity. Because of the apparent unity and coherence of our 
awareness, we can develop a sense of self that can gradually mature with our experiences of 
the world. This capacity lies at the heart of our ability to function as intelligent beings. 
The apparent unity and coherence of our experiences is all the more remarkable when 
we consider several properties of how the brain copes with the environmental events that it 
processes. First and foremost, these events are highly context-sensitive. When we look at a 
complex picture or scene as a whole, we can often recognize its objects and its meaning at 
a glance, as in the picture of Einstein's face in Figure la. However, if we process Einstein's 
face piece-by-piece, as through an aperture, then its significance is greatly degraded, as in 
Figure I b. To cope with this context-sensitivity, the brain typically processes pictures and 
other sense data in parallel, as patterns of activation across a large number of feature-sensitive 
nerve cells, or neurons. The same is true for senses other than vision, such as audition. If 
the sound of the word GO is altered by dipping off the vowel 0, then the consonant G may 
sound like a chirp, quite unlike its sound as part of GO. 
During vision, all the signals from a scene typically reach the photosensitive retinas of the 
eyes at essentially the same time, so parallel processing of all the scene's parts begins at the 
retina itself. During audition, each successive sound reaches the ear at a. later time. Before 
an entire pattern of sounds, such as the word GO, can be processed as a whole, it needs 
to be recoded, at a. later processing stage, into a simultaneously available spatial pattern of 
activation. Such a processing stage is often called a working memory, and the activations 
that it stores are often called short term memory (STM) traces. For example, when you hear 
an unfamiliar telephone number, you can temporarily store it in working memory while you 
walk over to the telephone and dial the number. 
In order to determine which of these patterns represents familiar events and which do 
not, the brain matches these patterns against stored representations of previous experiences 
that have been acquired through learning. Unlike the STM traces that are stored in a 
working memory, the learned experiences are stored in long term memory (l)TM) traces. 
One difference between STM and LTM traces concerns how they react to distractions. For 
example, if you are distra.cted by a loud noise before you dial a new telephone number, its 
STM representation can be rapidly reset so that you forget it. On the other hand, if you are 
distracted by a loud noise, you (hopefully) will not forget the r;rM representation of your 
own name! 
The problem of learning makes the unity of conscious experience particularly hard to 
understand, if only because we are able to rapidly learn such enormous amounts of new 
information, on our own, throughout life. For example, after seeing an exciting movie, we 
can tell our friends many details about it later on, even though the individual scenes flashed 
by very quickly. More generally, we can quickly learn about new environments, even if no 
one tells us how the rules of each environment differ. To a surprising degree, we can rapidly 
learn new facts without being forced to just as rapidly forget what we already know. As a 
result, we do not need to avoid going out into the world for fear that, in learning to recognize 
a new friend's face, we will suddenly forget our parents' faces. 
Many contemporary learning algorithms would not be so lucky! Speaking technically, 
the brain solves a very hard problem tha.t many current approaches to technology have not 
solved. It is a self-organizing system that is capable of rapid yet stable autonomous learning 
of huge amounts of data in a nonstationary environment. Discovering the brain's solution 
to this key problem is as important for understanding ourselves as it is for developing new 
pattern recognition and prediction applications in technology. 
I have called the problem whereby the brain learns quickly and stably without catastroph-
ically forgetting its past knowledge the stability-plasticity dilemma. The stability-plasticity 
dilemma must be solved by every brain system that needs to rapidly and adaptively respond 
to the flood of signals that subserves even the most ordinary experiences. If the brain's 
design is parsimonious, then we should expect to find similar design principles operating in 
all the brain systems that can stably learn an accumulating knowledge base in response to 
changing conditions throughout life. The discovery of such principles should clarify how the 
brain unifies diverse sources of information into coherent moments of conscious experience. 
This article reviews evidence that the brain does operate in this way. It summarizes 
several recent brain modeling studies that illustrate, and further develop, a theory called 
Adaptive Resonance Theory, or AHT, that I introduced twenty years ago. In the present 
article, I will briefly summarize four areas where AHT principles have been used to explain 
challenging behavioral and brain data. These areas are visual perception, visual object 
recognition, auditory source identification, and variable-rate speech recognition. On first 
inspection, the behavioral properties of these visual and auditory phenomena may seem to 
be entirely unrelated. On a deeper computational level, their governing neural circuits are 
proposed to incorporate a similar set of computational principles. 
I should also say right awa.y, however, that AHT principles do not seem to be used in all 
brain learning systems. Whereas ART learning designs help to expla.in cognitive processet~ 
such as perception, recognition, attention, reinforcement, recall, working memory, and mem-
ory search, other typet~ of learning seem to govern processes such as spatial navigation and 
certain aspects of sensory-motor control. In these latter task domains, it is adaptive to forget 
old coordinate transformations as the brain's control systems adjust to a growing body and 
to other changes in the body's sensory-motor endowment throughout life. 
How Do We Perceive Illusory Contours and Brightness? 
To illustrate the diversity of the phenomena that AHT does clarify, let rne mention a few 
examples. Consider the images in Figure 2. Figure 2;r shows an image ca.lled an Ehrenstein 
figure in which some radial black lines are drawn on a uniformly white paper. Remarkably, 
our minds construct a circular illusory contour that touches each line end at a perpendicular 
orientation. This illusory contour is a collective, emergent property of all the lines that only 
occurs when their positions relative to each other are suitable. For example, no illusory 
contour forms at the line ends in Figure 2b even though they end at the same positions as 
the lines in Figure 2a. Note also that the illusory contour in Figure 2a surrounds a disk that 
seems uniformly brighter than its surround. Where does the brightness enhancement come 
from? It certainly does not always happen when illusory contours form, as can be seen by 
inspecting Figure 2c. Here a vertical illusory contour can be recognized as interpolating the 
two sets of offset horizontal lines, even though neither side of the contour seems brighter 
than the other. How we can recognize something that we cannot see is a fascinating aspect 
2 
of our conscious awareness about which quite a bit is now known. Here I want to focus on 
why the Ehrenstein disk looks bright. 
How Do We Learn to Recognize Visually Perceived Objects? 
The Ehrenstein example concerns the process of visual perception. The next example 
concerns a process that goes on at a higher level of the visual system. It is the process 
whereby we visually recognize objects. A key part of this process concerns how we learn to 
categorize specific instances of an object, or set of objects, into a more general concept. For 
example, how do we learn that many different printed or script letter fonts can all repre-
sent the same letter A? Or how do we learn that several different combinations of patient 
symptoms are all due to the same disease? Moreover, how do we control how general our 
categories will become? For some purposes, like recognizing a particular face, we need highly 
specific categories. For others, like knowing that every person has a face, the categories are 
much more general. Finally, how does our learning and memory break down when something 
goes wrong in our brain? For example, it is known that lesions to the human hippocam-
pal system can cause a form of amnesia whereby, among other properties, patients find it 
very hard to learn new information and hard to remember recently learned information, but 
previously learned information about which their memory has "consolidated" can readily be 
retrieved. Thus, an amnesic patient can typically carry out a perfectly intelligent conver-
sation about experiences that occurred a significant time before the lesion that caused the 
amnesia occurred. 
What computational properties do the phenomena of bright illusory disks and amnesic 
memory have in common? I will suggest below that their apparent differences conceal the 
workings of a general unifying principle. 
How Do We Solve the Cocktail Party Problem? 
To continue with our list, let us now consider a different modality entirely; namely, 
audition. When we talk to a friend in a crowded noisy room, we can usually keep track of 
our conversation above the hubbub, even though the sounds emitted by the friendly voice 
partially overlap the sounds emitted by other speakers. How do we separate this jumbled 
mixture of sounds into distinct voices? Ths is often called the cocktail party problem. The 
same problem is solved whenever we listen to a symphony or other music wherein overlapping 
harmonic components are emitted by several instruments. If we could not separate the 
instruments or voices into distinct sources, or auditory streams, then we could not hear the 
music as music, or intelligently recognize a speaker's sounds. 
A simple version of this competence is illustrated by the auditory continuity illusion. 
Suppose that a steady tone shuts off just as a broadband noise turns or1. Suppose, moreover, 
that the noise shuts off just as the tone turns on once again; see Figure 3a. When this 
happens under appropriate conditions, the tone seems to continue right through the noise, 
which seems to occur in a separate auditory "stream". This example shows that the auditory 
system can actively extract those components of the noise that are consistent with the tone 
and use them to track the "voice" of the tone right through the hubbub of the noise. 
In order to appreciate how remarkable this property is, let us compare it with what 
happens when the tone does not turn on again for a second time, as in Figure 3b. Then the 
first tone does not seem to continue through the noise. It is perceived to stop before the 
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noise. How does the brain know that the second tone will turn on after the noise shuts off, 
so that it can continue the tone through the noise, yet not continue the tone through the 
noise if the second tone does not eventually occur? Does this not seem to require that the 
brain can operate "backwards in time" to alter its decision as to whether or not to continue 
a past tone through the noise based on future events? 
Many philosophers and scientists have puzzled about this sort of problem. I will argue 
that the process whereby we consciously hear the first tone takes some time to unfold, so 
that by the time we hear it, the second tone has already begun. To make this argument, we 
need to ask why does conscious audition take so long to occur after the actual sound energy 
reaches our brain? Just as important, why can the second tone influence the conscious 
percept so quickly, given that the first tone could not? Finally, I will indicate what these 
auditory phenomena have to do with bright Ehrenstein disks and amnesia. 
How Do We Consciously Perceive Speech? 
The final examples also involve the auditory system, but at a higher level of processing. 
They concern how we understand speech. In these examples, too, the process whereby 
conscious awareness occurs takes a long time, on the order of 100 milliseconds or more. An 
analysis of these percepts will also give us more clues about the nature of the underlying 
process. The first example is called phonemic restoration. Suppose, as in Figure 4, tlutt a 
listener hears a noise followed immediately by the words "eel is on the ... ". If this string 
of words is followed by the word "orange", then "noise-eel" sounds like "peel". If the word 
"wagon" completes the sentence, then "noise-eel" sounds like "wheel". If the final word is 
"show", then "noise-eel" sounds like "heel". 
This marvelous exmnple, which was developed by Richard Wanen a.nd his colleagues 
twenty-five years a.go, vividly shows that the bottom-up occurrence of the noise is not suffi-
cient for us to hear it. Somehow the sound that we expect to hear based upon our previous 
language experiences influences what we do hear, at least if the sentence is said quickly 
enough. As in the auditory continuity illusion, it would appear that the lmtin is working 
"backwards in time" to allow the meaning imparted by a later word 1,o alter the sounds that 
we consciously perceive in an earlier word. 
l suggest that this happens because, as the individmtl words occur, they are stored 
temporarily via STM traces in a. working memory. As the words are stored, they activate 
LTM traces which attempt to categorize the stored sound stream into familiar language units 
like words a.t a higher processing level. These list categories, in turn, activate learned top-
clown expectations that a.re matched against the contents of working memory to verify that 
the information expected from previous learning experiences is really there. This concept 
of bottom-up activation of learned categories by a working memory, followed by read-out of 
learned top-down expectations, is illustrated in Figure 4a. 
What is the nature of this matching, or verification, process? Its properties have been 
clarified by experiments of Arthur Samuel and others in which the spectra.! content of the 
noise was varied. If the noise includes all the formants of the expected sound, then that is 
what the subject hears, and other spectral components of the noise a.re suppressed. If some 
formants of the expected sound are missing from the noise, then only a partial reconstruction 
is heard. If silence replaces the noise, then only silence is heard. The matching process thus 
cannot "create something out of nothing". It can, however, selectively amplify the expected 
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features in the bottom-up signal and suppress the rest, as in Figures 4b and 4c. 
The process whereby the top-down expectation selectively amplifies some features while 
suppressing others helps to "focus attention" upon information that matches our momentary 
expectations. This focusing process helps to filter out the flood of sensory signals that would 
otherwise overwhelm us, and to prevent them from destabilizing our previously learned mem-
ories. Learned top-down expectations hereby help to solve the stability-plasticity dilemma 
by focusing attention and preventing spurious signals from accidentally eroding our previ-
ously learned memories. In fact, Gail Carpenter and I proved mathematically in 1987 that 
such an ART matching rule assures stable learning of an ART model in response to rapidly 
changing environments wherein learning becomes unstable if the matching rule is removed. 
. . 
What does all this have to do with our conscious percepts of speech? This can be seen by 
asking: If top-down expectations can select consistent bottom-up signals, then what keeps 
the selected bottom-up signals from reactivating their top-down expectations in a continuing 
cycle of bottom-up and top-down feedback? Nothing does! In fact, this reciprocal feedback 
process takes awhile to equilibrate, and when it does, the bottom-up and top-down signals 
lock the STM activity patterns of the interacting levels into <1 resonant state that lasts much 
longer and is more energetic than any individual activation. I claim that only resonant states 
of the brain can achieve consciousness, and that the time needed for a bottom-up/top-down 
resonance to develop helps to explain why a conscious percept of an event takes so long to 
occur after its bottom-up input is delivered. 
ART Matching and Resonance: The Link Between Attention, Intention, and 
Consciousness 
Adaptive resonance theory claims that, in order to solve the stability-plasticity dilem-
ma, only resonant; states can drive new learning. That is why the theory is called adaptive 
resonance theory. I will explain how this works more completely below. Before doing so, 
let me emphasize some implications of the previous discussion that are worth reflecting 
about. The first implication provides a novel answer to why, as philosophers have asked 
for many years, humans are "intentional" being;; who are always anticipating or planning 
their next behaviors and their expected con:>equences. ART suggests that "stability implies 
intentionality". That i;;, :>table learning requires that we have expectations about the world 
th<1t Me continually matched against world data. The second implication i;; that "intention 
implies attention and consciou;;ne;;s". That is, expectations start to focus attention on data 
worthy of learning, and these attentional foci are confirmed when the sy;;tem as a whole 
incorporates them into resonant states that inc:lude (I claim) conscious states of mind. 
Implicit in the concept of intentionality is the idea that we can get ready to experience an 
expected event so that, when it finally occur;;, we can react to it more quickly and vigorously, 
and until it occur:>, we are able to ignore other, less desired, events. This property is called 
priming. It implies that, when a top-down expectation is read-mit in the absence of a 
bottom-up input, it can :>ubliminally sensitize the cells that would ordinarily respond to the 
bottom-up input, but not actually fire them, while it suppresses cells whose activity is not 
expected. Correspondingly, the AH:T matching rule cornputationa.lly realizes the following 
properties at any processing level where bottom-up and top-down signals are matched: 
Bottom-Up Automatic Activation: A cell, or node, can become active enough to 
generate output signals if it receives a large enough bottom-up input, other things being 
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equal. 
Top-Down Priming: A cell can become sensitized, or subliminally active, and thus 
cannot generate output signals, if it receives only a large top-clown expectation input. 
Such a top-clown priming signal prepares a cell to react more quickly and vigorously to 
subsequent bottom-up input that matches the top-down prime. 
Match: A cell can become active if it receives large convergent bottom-up and top-clown 
inputs. Such a matching process can generate enhanced activation as resonance takes 
hold. 
Mismatch: A cell is suppressed even if it receives a large bottom-up input if it also 
receives only a small, or zero, top-down expectation input. 
1 claim that this ART matching rule and the resonance rule that it implies operate in 
all the examples that 1 ha.ve previously sketched, and do so to solve the stability-plasticity 
dilemma.. All the examples are proposed to illustrate how we can continue to learn rapidly 
a.nd stably about new experiences throughout life by matching bottom-up signal patterns 
from more peripheral to more central brain processing stages against top-down signal pat-
terns from more central to more peripheral processing stages. These top-down signals repre-
sent the brain's learned expectations of what the bottom-up signa.! patterns should be based 
upon past experience. The matching process is designed to reinforce and amplify those 
combinations of features in the bottom-up pattern that are consistent with the top-clown 
expectations, and to suppress those features that are inconsistent. This top-down matching 
step initiates the process whereby the brain selectively pays attention to experiences that 
it expects, binds them into coherent internal representations through resonant states, and 
incorporates them through learning into its knowledge about the world. 
Given that such a. resonant matching process occurs in the brain, how does the brain react 
when there is a mismatch situation? The AHT rnatching rule suggests that a. big enough 
mismatch between a bottom-up input and a. top-down expectation can rapidly attenuate 
activity a.t the matching level. This collapse of bottom-up activation can initiate a rapid 
reset of activity at both the matching level itself and at the subsequent levels that it feeds. 
Resonant Dynamics During Speech Categorization 
Many examples of such a reset event occur during variable-rate speech perception. As 
one example, consider how people hear combinations of vowels (V) and consonants (C) 
in VC-CV sequences. Bruno Repp at Haskins Laboratories has studied perception of the 
sequences [ib]--[ga] and [ib] [ba] when the silence interval between the initial VC syllable 
and the terminal CV syllable is varied. lf the silence interval is short enough, then [ib]-[ga.] 
sounds like [iga] and [ib]-[ba.] sounds like [iba]. Repp ran a nurnber of conditions, leading to 
the several data. curves displayed in Figure 5. The main point for present purposes is that 
the transition from a percept of [iba] to one of [ib]-[ba.] occurs after 100-150 milliseconds 
more silence than the transition from [iga] to [ib]-[ga]. One hundred milliseconds is a very 
long time relative to the time scale at which individual neurons can be activated. Why is 
this shift so large? 
My colleagues Ian Boardman, Michael Cohen, and 1 have quantitatively simulated these 
data. using a. model, called the A1tTPHONE model, of how a. resonant wave develops due 
to bottom-up and top-clown signal exchanges between a working memory that represents 
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the individual speech items and a list categorization network that groups them together 
into learned language units, or chunks. We have shown how a mismatch between [g] and 
[b] rapidly resets the working memory if the silence between them is short enough, thereby 
preventing the [b] sound from reaching resonance and consciousness, a.s in Figure 6. We 
have also shown how the development of a previous resonance involving [b] can fuse with a. 
subsequent [b] sound to greatly extend the perceived duration of [iba] across a. silence interval 
between [ib] and [ba], as in Figure 7a.. 
If, however, [ib] can fuse across time with [ba.], then how do we ever hear distinct [ib]-[ba.] 
sounds when the silence gets long enough? Much evidence suggests that after a. resonance 
fully develops, it spontaneously collapses after awhile due to a habituative process that goes 
on in the pathways that maintain the resonance via bottom-up and top-down signals. Thus, 
if the silence is long enough for resonant collapse of [ib] to occur, then a distinguishable [ba] 
resonance can subseqnently develop and be heard, as in Figure 7b. 
Resonant Dynamics During Auditory Streaming 
A similar type of resonant processing helps to explain cocktail party separation of dis-
tinct voices into auditory streams, as in the auditory continuity illusion of Figure 3. This 
process goes on, however, a.t earlier stages of auditory processing than speech categorization. 
My colleagues Krishna Govindarajan, Lonce Wyse, Michael Cohen, and I have developed 
a model, called the ARTSTREAM model, of how distinguishable auditory streams are res-
onantly formed and separated. Here the two main processing levels are a spectral stream 
level and a. pitch stream level, as in Figure 8. After the auditory ;;ignal is preprocessed, its 
spectral, or frequency, components are redundantly represented in multiple spectral streams. 
These streams are filtered by bottom-up ;;ignals that activate multiple representations of the 
sound';; pitch at the pitch stream level. These pitch representations compete to select a 
winner, which inhibits the redundant representations of the same pitch acro;;s streams, while 
also sending top-down matching signals back to the spectral stream level. By the AHT 
matching rule, the frequency components tha.t a.re consistent with the winning pitch node 
are amplified, and a.ll others are suppressed, thereby leading to a spectral-pitch resonance 
within the stream of the winning pitch node. In this way, the pitch layer coherently binds 
together the frequency components that correspond to a prescribed auditory source. All 
the frequency components that are suppressed by AH1' matching in this stream are freed to 
activate and resonate with a different pitch in a different stream. The net result is multiple 
resonances, each selectively grouping together into pitches those frequencies that correspond 
to distinct auditory sources. 
Using the AHTSTREAM model, we have sirnula.ted many of the basic streaming percepts, 
including those in Figure 9. The percept summarized in Figure 9c is the auditory continuity 
illusion. It occurs, I contend, because the spectral-stream resonance takes a time to develop 
that is commensurate to the duration of the subsequent noise. Once the tone resonance 
develops, the second tone can quickly act to support and maintain it throughout the duration 
of the noise, much a.s [ba.] fuses with [ib] during perception of [iba]. Of course, for this to make 
sense, one needs to accept the fact that the tone resonance does not start to get consciously 
heard until just about when the second tone occurs. 
Figure 8 incorporates one of the possible ways that Gail Carpenter and I proposed in 
the mid-1980's for how the AHT matching rule can be realized. This matching circuit is 
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redrawn in Figure 10 for clarity. Bottom-up signals to the spectral stream level can excite 
their target nodes if top-down signals are not active. Top-down signals try to excite those 
spectral nodes that are consistent with the pitch node that activates them. By themselves, 
top-down signals fail to activate spectral nodes because the pitch node also activates a pitch 
summation layer that nonspecifically inhibits all spectral nodes in its stream. The nonspecific 
top-down inhibition hereby prevents the specific top-down excitation from supraliminally 
activating any spectral nodes. On the other hand, when excitatory bottom-up and top-
down signals occur together, then those spectral nodes that receive both types of signals can 
be fully activated. All other nodes in that stream are inhibited, including spectral nodes 
that were previously activated by bottom-up signals but received no subsequent top-down 
pitch support. Attention hereby selectively activates consistent nodes while nonselectively 
inhibiting all other nodes in a stream. 
Resonant Dynamics During Brightness Perception 
Having come this far, let us review how ART matching and resonance help to explain 
the enhanced brightness of the Ehrenstein disk in Figure 2a. This apparently simple percept 
has attracted a great deal of attention from vision scientists because one could imagine many 
reasons why no brightness difference or the reverse brightness difference might have been seen · 
instead. John Kennedy has attempted to explain this percept by positing that "brightness 
buttons" occur at the ends of dark (low luminance) lines. The textbook mechanism for 
explaining these brightness buttons has, in turn, for decades been an appeal to the on-
center, off-surround receptive fields of early visual processing. A cell that possesses such a 
receptive field is excited by inputs near the cell's location (the on-centm·) but inhibited by 
inputs to more distant locations (the off-surround). 
An analysis of how such cells respond to dark lines shows, however, that they cannot, 
by themselves, explain brightness buttons. 1 show below why neither on-center off-surround 
cells (called 0 N cells below) nor off-center on-surround cells (called 0 FF cells below) can 
explain this phenomenon. Such ON and OFF cells occur in the lateral geniculate nucleus (or 
LGN), which is a waystation from the photosensitive retina in the eye to the visual cortex 
(Figure 11). Thus the ON and OFF cells that occur in the LGN, and that are the source of 
cortical brightness percepts, cannot explain brightness buttons without further processing. 
Figure 12 shows that whatever contribution to area contrast is generated at the ends of thin 
lines by ON or OFF cells must be less in rmtgnitude than that generated along their sides. As 
explained below, this should make the Ehrenstein disk appear darker, rather than brighter, 
than its surround. 
To see why this is so, assume as in Figure 12b that the thin line is black (low luminance) 
and surrounded by a white (high luminance) background. Since OFF cells respond best to 
low luminance in their receptive field center and high luminance in their surround, OFF cells 
whose centers lie inside the line will be activated. Furthermore, OFF cells near the line end 
(but still inside the line) will be more strongly activated than OFF cells in the middle of 
the line, because the line end is more like a black disk surrounded by a white background 
than the line middle is (Figure 12b). That is, an OFF cell whose center lies in the line end 
receives less inhibition from its surround than does a cell centered in the middle of the line, 
because a larger area of the former cell's surround lies in the white background. 
A similar analysis can be applied to the ON cells. An ON cell is excited by high luminance 
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in the center of its receptive field and low luminance in its surround. The ON cells that are 
active, then, are those centered outside the bar. An ON cell whose center is just outside the 
side of the line will respond more strongly than an ON cell centered just outside the end of 
the line (Figure 12c). 
Given that LGN ON and OFF cells, by themselves, cannot explain brightness buttons, 
it still remains to explain how a brighter Ehrenstein disk could be generated were brightness 
buttons to obtain. Clues were provided by John Kennedy, who analyzed a number of illusory 
contour stimuli. He argued that the effect of brightness buttons could often go unnoticed for 
isolated line segments, but could somehow be pooled and amplified in perceptual salience 
when several brightness buttons occurred in proximity or within a figurally complete region. 
In the mid-1980's, Michael Cohen, Ennio Mingolla, Dejan Todorovic:, and I presented an 
analysis and interpretation of Kennedy's remarks by developing a neural model of visual 
boundary and surface representation. 
In this model, the crucial mechanistic support for perceptually noticeable brightness 
buttons is a boundary segmentation that separates the region containing the buttons from 
other regions of a scene. Such a boundary segmentation may be generated by image edges, 
textures, or shading, and may give rise to illusory contours such as the Ehrenstein circle. 
We suggested how brightness buttons could, at a later processing stage, activate a diffusion 
process that could "fill-in" a uniform level of brightness within the bounding illusory con-
tour. The model successfully explained and predicted many facts about illusory contours and 
brightness percepts, among other phenomena, but it incorrectly predicted that the Ehren-
stein disk should look darker than its surround. Given that so many brightness data had 
been correctly predicted by the model, inc.luding data collected after its publication, the 
question arose of how the model's description was incomplete or incorrect. Such an analysis 
wa.s recently carried out with Alan Gove and Ennio Mingolla. We showed how the addition 
of a feedback loop from the visual cortex to the LGN helps to explain brightness buttons 
without disturbing the model's previous explanations of other brightness phenomena. 
The gist of this analysis can be summarized as follows. Brightne;,;;,; buttons are by defini-
tion an effect of an oriented structure such a.s a. line, or more generally a. corner or sharp bend 
in a contour, on perceived brightness. Within the prior model, the computations leading to 
brightness perception were unoriented, in the sense that they were initiated by ON and OFF 
cells with circularly syrnrnetric receptive fields. How then could the effects of oriented filter-
ing be used to modulate the input;,; to the FCS that produce brightness buttons? Indeed, 
oriented filtering alone could not suffice. Interactions must exist among the oriented filters 
to detennine the location of the ends of the lines, at which the brightness buttons occur. 
A natural candidate for the latter interactions is the cortical endstopping process that has 
been known, since the Nobel-prize winning work of David Hubel and Thorstein Wiesel, to 
convert cortical complex cells into endstoppcd complex, or hypercomplex, cells. These ori-
ented cell;,; are o<llectively activated at and near the ends of lines. Where should the results 
of this endstopped processing have their effect on brightness processing? 
Having come this far, it is plausible to propose that the cortex influences LGN cells 
via top-down feedback, which it is well known to do. It is not plausible, however, that 
this massive feedback pathway exists just to make Ehrenstein disks appear bright. I had, 
however, in 1976 predicted that corticogeniculate feedback exists for a potentially important 
functional reason; namely, to enhance the activity of LGN cells that support the activity 
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of presently active cortical cells, and to suppress the activity of LGN cells that do not. 
In addition, bottom-up retinal input, by itself, was hypothesized to supraliminally activate 
LGN cells, but top-down corticogeniculate feedback, by itself, was not. In other words, I 
predicted that corticogeniculate feedback realizes an ART matching and resonance rule that 
seems to control and stabilize learned changes in cortical LTM traces in response to the flood 
of visual experience. 
Figure 13 summarizes how this type of corticogeniculate feedback can produce brightness 
buttons. Figure 14 summarizes a computer simulation of brightness buttons in Figure 14b. 
The model's boundary completion network generates the circular illusory contour of Fig-
ure 14c. The brightness button activation pattern in Figure 14b generates a topographic 
input to a filling-in domain, wherein the inputs diffuse freely in all directions until they hit 
a barrier to filling-in that is imposed by the circular boundary signals in Figure 14c. The 
result is an Ehrenstein disk with uniformly enhanced brightness relative to its surround. The 
complete thalamocortical model is summarized in Figure 15. Its details can be studied in 
our forthcoming article in Visual Neuroscience. 
Is there direct experimental evidence that corticogeniculate feedback can alter LGN cell 
properties as desired? In 1987, Murphy and Sillito showed that cm·tical feedback causes 
significant length-tuning in cat LGN cells. As in cortical endstopping, the response to a line 
grows rapidly as a function of line length and then abruptly declines for longer lines. The 
response to long lines is hereby depressed. In HJ8G, Redies and his colleagues found that 
cat dorsal LGN cells and strongly endstoppecl cortical complex cells responded best at line 
ends. In other words, the response of the LGN cells to line ends was enhanced relative to 
the response to line sides. 
Is there direct experimental evidence for the prediction that corticogeniculate feedback 
supports AH:r matching and resonance? In a remarkable 1994. Nature article, Sillito and 
his colleagues published neurophysiolgical data that strikingly support this prediction. They 
wrote in particular that "cort,ica.lly induced correlation of relay cell activity produces coherent 
firing in those groups of relay cells with receptive field alignments appropriate to signal the 
particular orientation of the moving contour to the cortex ... this increases the ga.in of the 
input for feature-linked events detected by the cortex ... the cortico-thala.mie input is only 
strong enough to exert a.n effect on those dLGN cells that are additionally polarized by their 
retinal input ... the feedback circuit searches for conelations that support the 'hypothesis' 
represented by a particular pattern of cortical activity". 
How Early Does Attention Act in the Brain? 
If we take these results a.t face value, then it would appear that corticogeniculate feedback 
helps to "focus attention" upon expected patterns of LGN activity. However, it is typically 
argued that visual attention first a.cts at much higher levels of cortical organization, starting 
with the extrastriate visual cortex. Is there a contradiction here? The a.nswer depends upon 
how you define attention. If attention refers only to processes that can, at least under certain 
circumstances, be controlled voluntarily, then corticogeniculate feedback, being automatic, 
ma.y not qualify. On the other hand, it does appear to have the selective properties of a.n 
"automatic" attention process. What more does the brain need to add in order to generate a 
more flexible, task-dependent type of attention switching? This question leads us to our la.st 
example, that of visual object recognition, and how it breaks down during media.! temporal 
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amnesia. 
Self-Organizing Feature Maps for Learned Object Recognition 
Let us begin with a two-level network that illustrates some of the main ideas in a general 
setting. Level .r1 in Figure 16 contains a network of nodes, or cell populations, each of which 
is activated by a particular combination of sensory features via inputs. Level .Fz contains 
a network of nodes that represent recognition codes, or categories, which are selectively 
activated by the activation patterns across .FJ. Each .F1 node sends output signals to a 
subset of .Fz nodes. Each .F2 node thus receives inputs from many .F1 nodes. The thick 
arrow from .F1 to .Fz in Figure 16a represents in a concise way the array of diverging and 
converging pathways shown in Figure 16b. Let learning take place at the synapses denoted 
by semicircular endings in the .F1 _, .F2 pathways. Pathways that end in arrowheads do not 
undergo leMning. This bottom-up learning enables .r2 nodes to become selectively tuned to 
particular combinations of activation patterns across .F1 by changing their LTM traces. 
Why is not bottom-up learning sufficient in a system that can autonomously solve the 
stability-plasticity dilemma? Why are learned top-down expectations also needed? To un-
derstand this, we consider a type of model that is often called a self-organizing feature map, 
competitive learning, or learned vector quantization. This type of model shows how to 
combine associative learning and lateral inhibition for purposes of learned categorization. 
In such a model, as shown in Figure 17a., a.n input pattern registers itself as a. pattern of 
activity, or STM, across the feature detectors of level.F1. Each .r1 output signal is multiplied 
or gated, by the adaptive weight, or LTM trace, in its respective pathway. All these LTM-
gated inputs are added up at their target .r2 nodes. The J;rM tn1ces hereby filter the 
STM signal pattern and generate larger inputs to those .r2 nodes whose LTM patterns are 
most similar to the STM pattern. Latera.! inhibitory, or competitive, interactions within .Fz 
contrast-enhance this input pattern. Whereas many .Fz nodes rnay receive inputs from .F1, 
lateral inhibition allows a much smaller set of .F2 nodes to store their activation in STM. 
These are the .r2 nodes whose VrM patterns are most similar to the STM pattern. 
Only the .F2 nodes that win the competition and store their activity in STM can influence 
the learning process. STM activity opens a learning ga.te at the J;fl\1 traces that a.but the 
winning nodes. These LTM traces can then approach, or track, the input signals in their 
pathways, a process called steepest descent. This learning law is thus often called gated 
steepest descent, or insta.r learning. This type of learning tunes the winning J;rM patterns 
to become even more similar to the STM pattern, and to thereby enable the STM pattern 
to more effectively activate the corresponding .r2 nodes. I introduced this learning law 
into neural network models in the 1960's, and into ART models in the 1970's. Such an 
LTM trace can either increase or decrease to track the signa.ls in its pathway. It has been 
used to model neurophysiological data tlmt was collected in the 1980's about learning in 
the hippocampus (also called long term potentiation and long term depression) and about 
adaptive tuning of cortical feature detectors during early visual development, lending support 
to AHT predictions that these systems would employ this type of learning. 
Self-org;mizing feature map models were introduced and computationally characterized 
by Christoph von der Malsburg and myself during the 1970's. These models were subse-
quently applied and further developed by many authors, notably Tenvo Kohonen. They 
exhibit many useful properties, especially if not too many input patterns, or clusters of in-
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put patterns, perturb level .F1 relative to the number of categorizing nodes in level .F2. I 
proved that, under these sparse environmental conditions, category learning is stable in the 
sense that its LTM traces converge to fixed values as learning trials proceed. In addition, 
the LTM traces track the statistics of the environment, are self-normalizing, and oscillate 
a minimum number of times. Also, the category selection rule, like a Bayesian classifier, 
tends to minimize error. I also proved, however, that under arbiiraq environmental con-
ditions, learning becomes unstable. Such a model could forget your parents' faces when it 
learns a new face. Although a gradual switching off of plasticity can partially overcome this 
problem, such a mechanism cannot work in a learning system whose plasticity is maintained 
throughout adulthood. 
This memory instability is due to basic properties of associative learning and lateral 
inhibition, which are two processes that occur ubiquitously in the brain. An analysis of this 
instability, together with data about human and animal categorization, conditioning, and 
attention, led me to introduce ART models to stabilize the memory of self-organizing feature 
maps in response to an arbitrary stream of input patterns. 
How Does ART Stabilize Learning of a Self-Organizing Feature Map? 
How does an AHT model prevent such instabilities from developing? As noted above, in 
an ART model, learning does not occur when some winning .F2 activities are stored in STM. 
Instead, activation of .F2 nodes may be interpreted as "making a hypothesis" about an input 
at .F1 . When .F2 is activated, it quickly generates an output pattern that is transmitted along 
the top-down adaptive pathways from .F2 to .F1 . These top-down signals are multiplied in 
their respective pathways by r;rM traces at the semicircular synaptic knobs of Figure 17b. 
The r;rM-gated signals from all the active .F2 nodes are added to generate the total top-down 
feedback pattern from .F2 to .r1. It is this pattern that plays the role of a learned expectation. 
Activation of this expectation may be interpreted as "testing the hypothesis", or "reading 
out the prototype", of the active .F2 category. As shown in Figure 17b, AHT networks are 
designed to match the "expected prototype" of the category against the bottom-up input 
pattern, or exemplar, to .FJ. Nodes tlmt are activated by this exemplar are suppressed if they 
do not correspond to large r;rM traces in the top-down prototype pattern. The resultant 
.F1 pattern encodes the cluster of input features that the network deems relevant to the 
hypothesis based upon its past experience. This resultant activity pattern, called X* in 
Figure 17b, encodes the pattern of features to which the network "pays attention". 
If the expectation is close enough to the input exemplar, then a state of resonance de-
velops as the attentional focus takes hold. The pattern X* of attended features reactivates 
the .F2 category Y which, in turn, reactivates X*. The network locks into a resonant state 
through a positive feedback loop that dynamically links, or binds, X* with Y. The reso-
nance binds spatially distributed features into either a stable equilibrium or a synchronous 
oscillation, much like the synchronous feature binding in visual cortex that has recently at-
tracted so much interest after the experiments of Reinhard Eckhorn, Wolf Singer, and their 
colleagues. 
In ART, the resonant state, rather than bottom-up activation, is predicted to drive 
the learning process. The resonant state persists long enough, at a high enough activity 
level, to activate the slower learning processes in the LTM traces. This helps to explain 
how the r;rM traces can regulate the brain's fast information processing without necessarily 
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learning about the signals that they process. Through resonance as a mediating event, the 
combination of top-down matching and attentional focusing helps to stabilize ART learning 
and memory in response to an arbitrary input environment. The stabilizing properties of 
top-down matching may be one reason for the ubiquitous occurrence of reciprocal bottom-up 
and top-down cortico-cortical and cortico-thalamic interactions in the brain. 
Prototype Learning or Exemplar Learning? 
AHT systems lea.rn prototypes, rather than exemplars, because the attended feature 
vector X*, rather than the input exemplar itself, is learned. Both the bottom-up LTM 
traces that tune the category nodes and the top-down LTM traces that filter the learned 
expectation learn to correlate activation of :F2 nodes with the set of all attended X* vectors 
that they have ever experienced. These attended STM vectors assign less STM activity to 
features in the input vector I that mismatch the learned top-down prototype V than to 
features that match V. 
Given that ART systems learn prototypes, how can they also learn to recognize unique 
experiences, such as a particular view of a friend's face? The prototypes learned by ART 
systems accomplish this by realizing a qualitatively different concept of prototype than that 
offered by previous models. In particular, Gail Carpenter and I have shown with our stu-
dents how AHT prototypes form in a way that is designed to conjointly maximize category 
generalization while minimizing predictive error. As a result, ART prototypes can auto-
matically learn individual exemplars when environmental conditions require highly selective 
discriminations to be made. How the matching process achieves this is discussed below. 
Before describing how this is achieved, let us note what happens if the mismatch between 
bottom-up and top-down information is too great for a resonance to develop. Then the 
:F2 category is quickly reset and a memory search for a better category is initiated. This 
combination of top-down matching, attention focusing, and memory search is what stabilizes 
ART learning and memory in an arbitrary input environment. The attentional focusing by 
top-down matching prevents inputs that represent irrelevant features at :F1 from eroding the 
memory of previously leaxned J;fM prototypes. In addition, the memory search resct,s :F2 
categories so quickly when their prototype V rnismatches the input vector I that the more 
slowly varying LTM traces do not have an opportunity to correlate the attended :F1 activity 
vector X* with them. Conversely, the resonant event, when it docs occur, maintains and 
amplifies the matched STM activities for long enough and at high enough amplitudes for 
learning to occur in the LTM traces. 
\AJhether or not a resonance occurs depends upon the level of mismatch, or novelty, that 
the network is prepared to tolerate. Novelty is measured by how well a given exemplar 
matches the prototype that its presentation evokes. The criterion of an acceptable match 
is defined by an internally controlled panuneter that Carpenter and I have called vigilance. 
The vigilance parameter is computed in the orienting subsystem A; see Figure 16. Vigilance 
weighs how similar an input exemplar I must be to a top-down prototype V in order for 
resonance to occur. Resonance occurs if pill- IX*I ::; 0. This inequality says that the :F1 
attentional focus X* inhibits A rnore than the input I excites it. If A remains quiet, then an 
:F1 ...., :F2 resonance can develop. 
Either a larger value of p or a smaller match ratio IX*IIII-1 makes it harder to satisfy 
the resonance inequality. When p grows so large or IX*IIII-1 is so small that piii-IX*I > 0, 
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then A generates an arousal hurst, or novelty wave, that resets the STM pattern across Fz 
and initiates a bout of hypothesis testing, or memory search. During search, the orienting 
subsystem interacts with the attentional subsystem (Figures 17c and 17d) to rapidly reset 
mismatched categories and to select better F2 representations with which to categorize novel 
events at F 1 , without risking unseleetive forgetting of previous knowledge. Search may select 
a familiar category if its prototype is similar enough to the input to satisfy the resonance 
criterion. The prototype may then be refined by attentional focussing. If the input is too 
different from any previously learned prototype, then an uncommitted population of F2 cells 
is selected and learning of a new category is initiated. 
Because vigilance can vary across learning trials, recognition categories capable of encod-
ing widely differing degrees of generalization or abstraction can be learned by a single ART 
system. Low vigilance leads to broad generalization and abstract prototypes. Higb vigilance 
leads to narrow generalization and to prototypes that represent fewer input exemplars, even 
a single exemplar. Thus a single ART system may be used, say, to learn abstract prototypes 
with which to recognize abstract categories of faces and dogs, as well as "exemplar proto-
types" with which to recognize individual faces and dogs. A single system can learn both, as 
the need arises, by increasing vigilance just enough to activate A if a previous categorization 
leads to a predictive error. 
Corticohippocampal Interactions and Medial Temporal Amnesia 
As sequences of inputs are practiced over learning trials, the search process eventually 
converges upon stable categories. Gail Carpenter and I mathematically proved in 1987 
that familiar inputs directly access the category whose prototype provides the globally best 
match, while unfamiliar inputs engage the orienting subsystem to trigger memory searches 
for better categories until they become familiar. This process continues until the memory 
capacity, which can be chosen arbitrarily large, is fully utilized. The process whereby search 
is <Wtomatically disengaged is a. form of memory consolidation that enwrges from network 
interactions. Emergent consolidation does not preclude structural consolidation at individ-
ual cells, since the amplified and prolonged activities that subserve a resonance may be a 
trigger for learning-dependent cellular processes, such as protein synthesis a.nd transmitter 
production. 
The a.ttentiona.l subsystem of ART ha.s been used to model aspects of inferotemporal (IT) 
cortex, and the orienting subsystem models part of the hippocampal system. The interpre-
tation of ART dynamics in terms of IT cortex led Miller, Li, and Desimone to successfully 
test the prediction that cells in monkey IT cortex are reset after each trial in a working 
memory task. To illustrate the implications of an AHT interpretation of IT-hippocampal 
interactions, I will review how a lesion of the ART model's orienting subsystem creates 
a forrnal mernory disorder with symptoms much like the medial temporal amnesia that is 
caused in animals and human patients after hippocampal system lesions. In particular, such 
a lesion in vivo causes unlimited anterograde amnesia; limited retrograde amnesia.; failure 
of consolidation; tendency to learn the first event in a series; abnormal reactions to nov-
elty, including perseverative reactions; normal priming; and normal information processing 
of familiar events. 
Unlimited anterograde amnesia occurs because the network cannot carry out the memory 
search to learn a new recognition code. Limited retrograde amnesia occurs because familiar 
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events can directly access correct recognition codes. Before events become familiar, memory 
consolidation occurs which utilizes the orienting subsystem (Figure 17c). This failure of con-
solidation does not necessarily prevent learning per se. Instead, learning influences the first 
recognition category activated by bottom-up processing, much as amnesics are particularly 
strongly wedded to the first response they learn. Perseverative reactions can occur because 
the orienting subsystem cannot reset sensory representations or top-down expectations that 
may be persistently mismatched by bottom-up cues. The inability to search memory pre-
vents ART from discovering more appropriate stimulus combinations to attend. Normal 
priming occurs because it is mediated by the attentional subsystem. 
Similar behavioral problems have been identified in hippocampectomized monkeys. Gaf-
fan noted that fornix transection "impairs ability to change an established habit ... in a. 
different set of circumstances that is similar to the first and therefore liable to be confused 
with it". In ART, a defective orienting subsystem prevents the memory search whereby 
different representations could be learned for similar events. Pribra.m called such a. process 
a "competence for recombinant context-sensitive processing". These ART mechanisms il-
lustrate how, as Zola-Morgan and Squire have reported, memory consolidation and novelty 
detection may be mediated by the same neural structures. Why hippoca.mpectomized rats 
have difficulty orienting to novel cues and why there is a progressive reduction in novelty-
related hippocampal potentials as learning proceeds in normal rats is also clarified. In ART, 
the orienting system is automatically disengaged a.s events become familiar during the mem-
ory consolidation process. 
How Universal are ART Processes in the Brain'? 
In all the examples discussed above---from early vision, visual object recognition, audi-
tory streaming, and speech recognition--ART matching and resonance have played a central 
role in models that help to explain how the brain stabilizes its learned adaptations in re-
sponse to changing environmental conditions. This type of matching can be achieveclnsing 
a top-clown nonspecific inhibitory gain control that down-regulates all target cells except 
those that also receive top-down specific excitatory signals, as in Figure 10. Are there yet 
other brain processes that utilize these mechanisms? 
With my colleagues Mario Aguilar, Dan Bullock, and Karen Roberts, a neural model 
has been developed to explain how the superior colliculus learns to use visual, auditory, and 
somatosensory signals to control planned and visually reactive eye movements. This model 
was also led to use ART matching and resonance to explain behavioral and neural data 
about multimodal eye movement control. The model clarifies how multimoda.l commands 
learn to generate mutually consistent movement commands, and how attention gets focused 
on a, prescribed movement target location. 
Recent experiments from Marcus Ra,ichle's lab at Washington University using positron 
emission tomography (PET) strongly support the idea. that AHT top-down priming also 
occurs in human somatosensory cortex. In their experiments, attending to an impending 
stimulus to the ftngers caused inhibition of nearly cortical cells that code for the face, but 
not cells that code the fingers. Likewise, priming of the toes produced inhibition of nearby 
cells that code for the fingers and face, but not cells that code for the toes. 
Thus early vision, visual object recognition, auditory streaming, speech recognition, eye 
movement control, and somatosensory representation may all incorporate variants of the 
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circuit depicted in Figure 10. These results suggest that a type of "automatic" attention 
operates even at early levels of brain processing, such as the lateral geniculate, but that some 
higher levels benefit from an orienting subsystem that can be used to flexibly reset attention 
and to facilitate voluntary control of top-down expectations. 
Given this type of circuit, how could top-down priming be released from inhibition to 
enable us to voluntarily experience internal thinking and fantasies? This could be achieved 
through an "act of will" that activates inhibitory cells which inhibit the nonspecific inhibitory 
interneurons and thereby disinhibit the cells receiving the top-clown signals, as in Figure 10. 
These cells are then free to generate self-initiated resonances. 
Thus we arrive at an emerging picture of how the adaptive brain works wherein issues of 
stability and plasticity are joined with properties of attention, intention, thinking, fantasy, 
and consciousness. The mediating events are adaptive resonances that effect a dynamic 
balance between the complementary demands of stability and plasticity, and of expectation 
and novelty, whose maintenance throughout life in a changing world is one of the core 
challenges that we face in trying to live our lives fully and well. 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
Figure 1. When Einstein's face (A) is seen through small apertures (13), its meaning as a 
face is greatly degraded. 
Figure 2. (A) The Ehrenstein pattern generates a circular illusory contour that encloses a 
circular disk of enhanced illusory brightness. (B) If the endpoints of the Ehrenstein pattern 
remain fixed while their orientations are tilted, then both the illusory contour and brightness 
vanish. (C) The offset pattern generates a vertical boundary that can be recognized even 
though it cannot be seen. 
Figure 3. (A) Auditory continuity illusion: When a steady tone occurs both before and 
after a burst of noise, then under appropriate temporal and amplitude conditions, the tone is 
perceived to continue through the noise. (B) This does not occur if the noise is not followed 
by a tone. 
Figure 4. (A) Auditory iterns activate STM traces in a working memory, which send 
bottom-up signals towards a level at which list categories, or chunks, are activated in STM. 
These bottom-up signals are multiplied by learned LTM traces which influence the selection 
of the list categories that are stored in STM. The list categories, in turn, activate LTM-
modulated top-down expectation signals that are matched against the active STM pattern 
in working memory. (B) This matching process confirms and amplifies STM activations that 
are supported by contiguous LTM traces, and suppresses those that are not. 
Figure 5. The left-hand curves represent the probability, under several experimental con-
fitions, that the subject will hear [ib]-[ga]rather than [iga]. The right-hand curves do the 
same for [ib]-·[ba.] rather tha.n the fused percept [iba]. Note that the perception of [iba.] c<m 
occur at a silence interval between [ib] <llld [ba] that is up to 150 rnilliseconds longer than the 
one that leads to the percept [iga] instead of [ib]·-[ga]. (Data are reprinted with permission 
frorn B.H. Rcpp (1980), Haskins Laboratories Status Report. on Speech Research, SR-61, 
151-165.) 
Figure 6. (A) Response to a single stop, such as [b] or [g], with and without resonance. 
Suprathreshold activation is shaded. (B) Reset due to phonologic misrnatch between [ib] 
a.nd [ga]. 
Figure 7. (A) Fusion in response to proximal similar phones. (B) Perceptual silence allows 
a 2-stop percept. 
Figure 8. Block diagram of the A H.TSTREAM auditory streaming model. Note the non-
specific top-down inhibitory signals from the pitch level to the spectral level that realize 
ART matching within the 1wtwork. 
Figure 9. Illustrative stimuli and the listeners' percepts that AHTSTREAM model simu-
lations emulate. The hashed boxes represent broadband noise. The stimuli consist of: (A) 
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two inharmonic tones, (B) tone-silence-tone, (C) tone-noise-tone, (D) a ramp or glide-noise-
glide, (E) crossing glides, (F) crossing glides where the intersection point has been replaced 
by silence, (G) crossing glides where the intersection point has been replaced by noise, (I-I) 
Steiger diamond stimulus, and (I) Steiger diamond stimulus where bifurcation points have 
been replaced by noise. 
Figure 10. One way to realize the AHT matching rule using top-down activation of non-
specific inhibitory interneurons, as in Figure 8. Several mathematically possible alternative 
ways are suggested in the Appendix of G.A. Carpenter and S. Grossberg, 1987, Computer 
Vision, Graphics, and Image Processing, 37, pp. 54-115. 
Figure 11. Light registered on the photosensitive retina of the eye is processed by the 
lateral geniculate nucleus before activating the visual cortex. The visual system appears in 
this representation of the human brain as viewed from below. Visual pathway from retinas 
to cortex via the lateral geniculate body is shown in gnty. 
Figure 12. Retinal center-surround cells and their optimal stimuli (A). The ON cell, on 
the left, responds best to a high luminance disk surrounded by a low luminance annulus. 
The OFF cell, on the right, responds best to a low luminance disk surrounded by a high 
luminance annulus (B). OFF cells respond to the inside of a black line. The OFF cell 
centered at the line end responds more strongly than the OFF cell centered in the middle, 
because the surround region of the former cell is closer to optimal. In (C) ON cells respond 
to the white background just outside the black line. The amount of overlap of each ON cell's 
surround with the black line affects the strength of the cell's response. As seen in the ON 
cell's optirnal stimulus (C), the more of the surround that is stimulated by a black region, 
the better the ON cell will respond. Thus, an ON cell centered just outside the side of the 
line will respond better than a cell centered just outside the end of the line. 
Figure 13. (A) The Ehrenstein figure. (B) The LGN stage response. Both ON and OFF cell 
activities are coded as rectified deflections from a neutral gray. Note the brightness buttons 
at the line ends. (C) The equilibriurn boundaries. (D) In the filled-in surface brightness, the 
central disk contains larger activities than the background, corresponding to the perception 
of increased brightness. 
Figure 14. Schematic diagram of brightness button formation in the model. In (A) the 
distribution of model LGN cell activities prior to receiving any feedback, in response to 
a black bar is illustrated. Open circles code ON cell activity; filled circles code OFF cell 
activity. (B) shows the effect of feedback in bottom-up LGN activations. (C) shows the 
LGN activity distribution after feedback. A brightness button is formed outside both ends 
of the line. 
Figure 15. Vision model macrocircuit. Boundary completion stages a.re designated by 
octagonal boxes, surface filling-in stages by rectangular boxes. 
Figure 16. An example of a model AHT circuit in which attentional and orienting circuits 
interact. Level F1 encodes a distributed representation of an event by a short term memory 
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(STM) activation pattern across a network of feature detectors. Level F 2 encodes the event 
using a compressed STM representation of the F 1 pattern. Learning of these recognition 
codes occurs at the long term memory (r;rM) traces within the bottom-up and top-down 
pathways between levels F1 and F 2. The top-down pathways read-out learned expectations 
whose prototypes are matched against bottom-up input patterns at F1. The size of mis-
matches in response to novel events are evaluated relative to the vigilance parameter p of 
the orienting subsystem A. A large enough mismatch resets the recognition code that is 
active in STM at Fz and initiates a memory search for a more appropriate recognition code. 
Output from subsystem A can also trigger an orienting response. (A) Block diagram of cir-
cuit. (B) Individua.l pathways of circuit, including the input level Fo that generates inputs 
. . 
to level F1. The gain control input g1 to level F1 helps to instantiate the matching rule (see 
text). Gain control g2 to level F2 is needed to instate a category in STM. 
Figure 17. ART search for a recognition code: (A) The input pattern I is instated across 
the feature detectors at level F1 as a short term memory (STM) activity pattern X. Input 
I also nonspecifically activates the orienting subsystem A; see Figure 1. STM pattern X 
is represented by the hatched pattern across F 1. Pattern X both inhibits A and generates 
the output pattern S. Pattern S is multiplied by long term memory (LTM) traces and 
added at F2 nodes to form the input pattern T, which actiw1tes the STM pattern Y across 
the recognition categories coded at level F 2. (B) Pattern Y generates the top-down output 
pattern U which is multiplied by top-clown J;rM traces and added at ;:1 nodes to form 
the prototype pattern V that encodes the learned expectation of the active F2 nodes. If 
V mismatches I at F 1, then a new STM activity pattern X* is generated at F 1. X* is 
represented by the hatched pattern. It includes the features of I that are confirmed by V. 
Inactivated nodes corresponding to unconfirmed features of X are unhatched. The reduction 
in total STM activity which occurs when X is transfonned into X* causes a decrease in the 
total inhibition from F1 to A. (C) If inhibition decreases sufficiently, A releases a nonspecific 
arousal wave to F 2, which resets the STM pattern Y at F 2. (D) After Y is inhibited, its top-
down prototype signal is eliminated, and X can be reinstated at F1. Enduring traces of the 
prior reset lead X to activate a different STM pattern Y* at F 2. If the top-down prototype 
due to Y* also mismatches I at F1, then the search for an appropriate F 2 code continues 
until a more appropriate F2 representation is selected. Then an attentive resonance develops 
and learning of the attended data is initiated. [Reprinted with permission from Carpenter 
and Grossberg (199:3).] 
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